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1. Scope of the precautionary principle. Birch (2017) provides a formulation of the 
precautionary principle as a scientific criterion to make it more applicable to animal sentience 
and the use of animals. He divides the principle into an epistemological component (what 
standards should we use to judge whether we have sufficient evidence to consider an animal 
most likely sentient?), which he calls BAR and a practical component (what action should we 
take on the basis of this evidence?), which he calls ACT. The concern with Birch’s specification of 
BAR is that it may set an unreasonably high evidential requirement that would then rule out 
many of the cases in which we wish to apply the precautionary principle. 
The precautionary principle was originally intended to apply to decision-making under 
conditions of uncertainty where there is a possibility of doing great harm. According to the 
original document of the Commission of European Communities, it should be applied “where 
scientific information is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and where there are indications 
that the potential effects … may be potentially dangerous” (cited in Croney & Millman 2007, p. 
559). Birch outlines the general animal sentience precautionary principle (ASPP): “where there 
are threats of serious, negative animal welfare outcomes, lack of full scientific certainty as to the 
sentience of the animals in question shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent those outcomes” (3). However, the cases in which we have less than full 
scientific certainty vary widely, from a level of confidence less than 1 all the way down to having 
no idea either way (Steel 2015).   
Many of these cases will not fall under the conditions described in BAR: “for the purposes of 
formulating animal protection legislation, there is sufficient evidence that animals of a particular 
order are sentient if there is statistically significant evidence, obtained by experiments that 
meet normal scientific standards, of the presence of at least one credible indicator of sentience 
in at least one species of that order” (5). Although this is intended to be a lower than normal bar 
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for evidence, as only a single credible indicator is required, the call for statistically significant 
results obtained through the process of scientific experimentation is still quite rigorous. If we 
accept the strong formulation of BAR, there may no longer be the uncertainty that the 
precautionary principle is designed to address, leaving instead just the standard scientific 
inference-to-the-best-hypothesis to account for the available evidence. This could be too 
demanding for the sentience hypothesis in many cases, thereby ruling out or deferring the 
protection of sentient species and causing the potential harm the principle was intended to 
minimize. If the precautionary principle is intended to provide “tools and guidelines for 
decisions in which the science is inadequate” (deFur & Kaszuba 2002, p. 165), then BAR will fail 
to rule on many such cases. So, which cases should we allow? 
Birch rules out applying the precautionary principle in all cases where there is no evidence – a 
“default presumption of sentience” (5) that could create significant practical roadblocks to 
animal use, possibly without warrant, and would undermine the role of scientific work in helping 
determine the scope of animal protection legislation. However, there is another set of cases 
between those in which we have no evidence either way and those in which we have strong 
scientific evidence of at least one indicator of sentience. These are the cases in which we have 
some indications of sentience through less rigorous observational or anecdotal evidence. This 
fits with Birch’s comment that while “we should require some evidence … the bar should be set 
at a level low enough to avoid a prolonged period of inaction that may turn out, retrospectively, 
to have allowed a serious and preventable harm to occur” (3). I suggest that reliable anecdotal 
evidence may be sufficient to prompt us to apply the precautionary principle in these cases, as 
this is an indicator of the potential for significant harm and seems to be precisely the sort of 
case for which this principle is intended.  
 
2. Anecdotal evidence. Anecdotal evidence has frequently been criticised as unscientific, too 
subjective, and prone to bias and anthropomorphism, leading to misinterpretation of the 
observations (Bekoff 2000, Heyes 1998, Moore & Stilgoe 2009). However, the use of carefully 
selected observations and anecdotes can overcome some of these issues. Bates & Byrne (2007) 
argue that carefully collected anecdotes can form a valuable source of information – “the plural 
of anecdote can be data” (14). Rollin (1997) argues that the use of anecdotal evidence is 
appropriate so long as there is a plausible link from the story to the inference made, supported 
by common sense and background knowledge. Use of any story from someone who has 
encountered a member of the species of interest is clearly insufficient, but repeated 
independent observations by researchers and husbandry professionals deeply familiar with the 
species should not be dismissed so lightly.  
This is the case for much work in animal cognition and behavioural ecology where rare 
observations of particular behaviour patterns may be all the evidence available. Russon & 
Galdikas (1993) used the analysis of a large collection of single observations of spontaneous 
behaviour in order to establish the capacity for imitation in orangutans – something that had 
frequently been observed but never scientifically accepted because of the ‘anecdotal’ nature of 
the reports and the inability to replicate results in a lab setting. Bates & Byrne (2007) describe 
the case of studies of infanticide: when researchers started looking into the cases described, 
they found that hunters and explorers had been witnessing the events for a century, “but each 
single observation had been rejected as anecdotal and unsubstantiated” (13). Wider sampling 
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and observation confirmed these early observations: “If these anecdotes had been ignored, we 
would still be blind to the causes and consequences of this highly significant behaviour” (14). In 
cases like these, the right sort of anecdotal evidence may be the best source of evidence we 
have available: “if no formal evidence can be found, then anecdotal information provides the 
best and only information on which to base our understanding and decisions” (Enkin & Jadad 
1998, p. 965). 
Anecdotal evidence is often cited as a good source of information to derive testable 
hypotheses and guide the direction of future study (Bekoff 2000, Burghardt 1985, Kamil 1988). 
This is useful precisely because well-collected anecdotal evidence often points at features that 
will later be confirmed through more rigorous scientific analysis. Where this is likely to be the 
case, we have a reason to apply the precautionary principle on the basis of reliable anecdotal 
evidence. 
 
3. Lesson from the case of cephalopods. An example in which the precautionary principle could 
have been usefully applied in the face of long-running anecdotal evidence is the cephalopods 
(octopuses, squid and cuttlefish). Popular accounts and observations have long noted the 
cognitive abilities of octopuses (see anecdotal evidence described by Moynihan 1997, and 
stories collected by Linden 2002); however, underperformance in experimental settings led to 
these stories being ignored by researchers in favour of reductionist explanations that did not 
require intelligence or sentience. Godfrey-Smith (2016) suggests that the reason the 
experimental work failed to capture cephalopod abilities may have been the unpredictable 
nature of octopuses, who do not settle quietly into laboratory settings and often “turn the 
apparatus around them to their own octopodean purposes” (52). They often seem unmotivated 
to participate in experiments that are not interesting to them. More recent work has provided 
strong evidence to corroborate the earlier anecdotes and the presence of sentience (see e.g. 
Godfrey-Smith 2016, Catalani 2008, Vitti 2013, Ikeda 2009, Godfrey-Smith 2013, Mather 2008). 
Cephalopods have been widely used in scientific research for over a century (Fiorito et al. 
2015). Although the UK has had animal protection legislation in place since 1876, this was not 
extended to cephalopods until the inclusion of Octopus vulgaris in 1993 and all cephalopods in 
the recent revision of European standards that took effect in 2013 (Andrews 2011). Canada 
included cephalopods in their 1991 regulations, New Zealand in 1999, some Australian states in 
2004, Switzerland in 2008, and Norway in 2009 (Smith et al. 2013). The change to the European 
standards followed the examination of the evidence (Fiorito et al. 2015) from anatomy, 
physiology and behaviour) “of cephalopods’ ability to experience pain, suffering, distress and 
lasting harm” (Smith et al. 2013). The change following this legislation was immediate and 
measurable. Between 2005 and 2011 (prior to the legislation), at least 370 papers on 
cephalopods were published by EU researchers using methods that could cause pain and 
suffering (Smith et al. 2013); between 2013 and 2015 no such invasive cephalopod studies were 
conducted (Fiorito et al. 2015). Had the precautionary principle been used earlier, based on the 
large body of anecdotal and observational evidence, this may have prevented much of what is 
now known to be pain and suffering for cephalopods. 
 
4. Conclusion. Statistically significant experimental evidence may be the gold standard for 
validating the sentience of animals studied, but this may be too demanding for the application 
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of the precautionary principle. Where we have relevant anecdotal or observational evidence 
that the animals are likely to be sentient, from reliable people familiar with the species, this 
should be accepted not only as a guide for future research, but as grounds for applying the 
precautionary principle and being more careful in our use of these animals until we have greater 
certainty. This proposal is compatible with a proportionality principle (Steel 2015) in which we 
scale the type of action taken to correspond to the degree of available evidence. Hence it does 
not necessarily entail costly action. That way we could minimise potential harm more effectively 
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On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and 
Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU Animal Studies will 
host a conference on Animal Consciousness. 
 
This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss 
questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish feel pain? Are non-
human mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does 
research on animal consciousness affect the ethical treatment of animals? What 
is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness 




Speakers and panelists include: 
  
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of 
Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology),  
Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland, 
Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts, 
Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience),  
Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney, 
Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary 
Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel 
Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter, 
Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy) 
 
 
Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao. 
 
The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E 
8th St).  
 
Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”, “Do fish feel pain?”, and “Animal consciousness 
and ethics”.  
 
Saturday sessions will include “Animal self-consciousness”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel 
discussion.  
 
A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date. 
 
Registration is free but required.  
 
Register here.  
 
See also the conference website. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
